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THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT: PROTECTING
A MAN'S RIGHT TO INFANT-CARE LEAVE
I. INTRODUCTION
Infants can benefit from a man's influence in child care.' Tradi-
tional employment practices in the United States,2 however, can op-
erate to limit a man's ability to exert his parenting influence. Em-
ployment practices that grant infant care leave solely to female
employees deny male employees the right to fully participate in early
child care. In addition, these employment practices tend to reinforce
the stereotype' that women are the only legitimate providers of in-
fant care.
Fortunately, the combined actions of both Congress and the Su-
preme Court provide men a new Title VIP employment right to
participate in early child care. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act5 prohibits employment discrimination. Specifically, Title VII
section 703(a)6 prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
C 1985 by Cynthia Hecht.
1. The following are research findings on the effects of a father's participation in early
child care: fathers can play a unique and influential role in infant child care by developing
particular cognitive abilities and positive personality traits in their infants, R. PARKE, FA-
THERS 70 (1981); from birth, a father can directly influence the development of exploration,
independence and autonomy in his infant, M. YOGMAN, OBSERVATIONS ON THE FATHER-
INFANT RELATIONSHIP 119-20 (1982); an infant who is securely attached to both mother and
father may be less vulnerable to stress because the relationship with one parent can compen-
sate for difficulties in the relationship with the other, Id.; child development depends on sus-
tained, concentrated interaction with parents and the early weeks and months of the child's life
are a critical period in personality formation, S. KAMERMAN, MATERNITY POLICIES AND
WORKING WOMEN 13 (1983).
2. Many other countries have recognized the importance of parental leave employment
benefits. In fact, 75 countries, including many developing countries and every industrial coun-
try except the United States, provide some variation of parental child care leave, S.
KAMERMAN, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING WOMEN 13 (1983).
3. See supra note 1.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982).
5. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, as amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-
17 (1982).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982):
(a) Employer Practices. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
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an individual's sex.
Congress' amendment of Title VII in 1978 was a first step to-
ward protecting a man's right to participate in infant care. Congress
enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act 7 [hereinafter "PDA"] to
expand Title VII's employment discrimination prohibitions. The
PDA amendment to Title VII defines discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy as unlawful sex discrimination. The PDA requires that
women affected by pregnancy be "treated the same" as other persons
"for all employment-related purposes including the receipt of bene-
fits under fringe benefit programs. '
Thus, under Title VII as amended by the PDA, an employer
may not treat the sexes differently. Yet, a man's right to child-care
leave is not fully secured by the language of the amendment alone
because the PDA contains no reference to the scope of a male em-
ployee's right to pregnancy-related fringe benefits.
The Supreme Court's first interpretation of the PDA, however,
provided the next step toward creating a new Title VII employment
right for male employees. 9 The Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v EEOC'0 decision expressly held that the PDA protects
men in at least one employer-provided fringe benefit-a medical
benefits plan." The Newport News decision did not address how the
PDA affects the allocation of another employer-provided fringe ben-
efit-infant-care leave. Thus, the Newport News decision left unan-
swered whether an employer who provides female employees with
an infant-care leave fringe benefit, but does not provide a similar
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ-
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive an individual of em-
ployment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id.
7. Title VII § 701(k), Pub. L. No. 555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k)
(1982). The text of the amendment reads:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condi-
tions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including
receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so af-
fected but similar in their ability or inability to work .. ..
Id.
8. id.
9. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983); see
also infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
10. 462 U.S. 669.
11. Id. at 684.
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leave for male employees, has discriminated against male employees
within the meaning of the PDA. An affirmative answer to this ques-
tion provides men a new employment right to an employer's existing
infant-care leave benefits.
This comment will demonstrate that a synthesis of the PDA
and the Newport News decision provides men a new right to em-
ployer-provided infant-care leave."2 First, a pervasive "identity of
treatment" philosophy will be gleaned from an analysis of pre-PDA
Supreme Court pregnancy discrimination case law, the PDA legisla-
tive history, and the Newport News decision. The ultimate goal of
this same-treatment philosophy is equal/interchangeable treatment
of the sexes in the workforce. Second, the comment will propose that
infant-care leave should be considered a fringe benefit for the PDA
purposes. Finally, the comment will demonstrate that the PDA pro-
tections extend to men and therefore give male employees a right to
employer-provided child-care leave fringe benefits.
II. PDA-AMENDED TITLE VII MANDATES THAT EMPLOYEES
BE TREATED THE SAME
Title VII broadly prohibits employment discrimination based
upon race, color, sex, or national origin." The statute makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to treat employees
differently on the basis of any of the enumerated protected classifica-
tions. The plain language of Title VII mandates that protected clas-
12. This comment does not address the related problem about the right to pregnancy
disability leave when the employer does not provide such a benefit. The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals has recently held that a California statute, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945 (West 1985),
which guarantees female workers a leave of up to four months if they become disabled because
of childbirth or pregnancy-related medical conditions is compatible with Title V1I. California
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Gurerra, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985).
The propriety of statutes which force employers to provide leave to women only is a
current subject of controversy. The controversy arises because Title VII mandates all employ-
ees be treated the same for all purposes, including the allocation of employment leave benefits.
Opponents of statutes such as California's believe that pregnancy-based distinctions subvert the
goal of sexual equality by implying that women need special assistance to perform as equals in
the workplace. Proponents say, however, that because only women can become pregnant, it is
not illegal sex discrimination to single them out for benefits that are not required for other
workers. Proponents say that requiring such leave for women will ultimately require employ-
ers who do not provide child-care leave benefits to provide them for parents of both sexes. For
a more detailed discussion of this debate, see Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984); Weissmann, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 690 (1983); and Krieger, The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE 513
(1983).
13. See supra note 6.
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ses be treated equally with regard to the distribution of all employ-
ment benefits. The statute does not require special treatment for any
employee; on the contrary, its plain language requires all employees
be treated the same.
1 4
Similarly, the plain language of the PDA 5 does not require
special treatment for any employee, nor does it limit the scope of the
sex discrimination definition to women. Rather, the PDA amended
Title VII by expanding the definition of sex discrimination to in-
clude discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and related medical
conditions." The following authorities have consistently endorsed
identical treatment of the sexes under Title VII: a) pre-PDA Su-
preme Court Title VII pregnancy discrimination cases, b) the
PDA'a legislative history, and c) the PDA's administrative interpre-
tation. These endorsements should logically provide men PDA pro-
tection for pregnancy-related employment benefits.
A. Supreme Court Title VII Pregnancy Discrimination Cases
Prior to PDA
Supreme Court pregnancy discrimination cases decided prior to
the enactment of the PDA held that Title VII mandates employers
to treat all employees the same without regard to the biological fact
that pregnancy is unique to women. Under the pre-PDA Title VII
analysis, the Court could do no more than to insure that pregnant
employees were treated no worse but no better than non-pregnant
employees.' 7 Without any PDA requirement that all employees be
treated the same with respect to pregnancy-related benefits, the
Court could not begin to recognize the rights of even female employ-
ees in the area of child-care leave. In these early cases, the Court
consistently held, however, that Title VII requires that employees of
both sexes be treated identically with regard to the allocation of em-
ployment fringe benefits. 8 These Supreme Court decisions mark a
significant first step to recognizing a man's right to receive child-care
leave benefits.
14. Id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1982). "The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex'
include, but are not limited to, because or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions. ... (emphasis added).
16. See supra notes 7 and 15.
17. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,
434 U.S. 136 (1977).
18. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434
U.S. 136 (1977). See also infra notes 19-32 and accompanying text.
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General Electric Co. v. Gilbert1 9 was the Court's first Title VII
pregnancy discrimination case. This case held that under Title VII,
an employer may exclude pregnancy-related disabilities from an oth-
erwise comprehensive medical benefits plan.20 This case provides
guidance in evaluating whether a man has a right to child-care leave
benefits; neither sex can be protected by the statute in this area un-
less Title VII prohibits discrimination in allocating pregnancy-re-
lated benefits. At the time of Gilbert, the Court had no guidance
from Congress that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy benefits
was equivalent to discrimination based on sex.21 Therefore, it held
that an employer need not provide pregnancy-related benefits at all
because this would entail treating men and women differently based
on their sex. The Court did not seek guidance from guidelines issued
in 1972 by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [here-
inafter "EEOC"]. 2 2 The EEOC was named by Congress to adminis-
ter Title VII, 3 and the agency had already issued the guidelines in
1972 to interpret what constitutes sex discrimination for Title VII
purposes. One of the guidelines stated that benefits for pregnancy
disabilities shall be applied on the same terms as they are applied to
other temporary disabilities. 4 The Court declined to adhere to the
guidelines because as such, they did not carry the force of law; 5 they
were not a contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII;2 and they
conflicted with earlier EEOC pronouncements.27
The Court held that "pregnancy-related disabilities constitute
an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate
them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the bene-
fits, accruing to men and women alike."2 The Court in Gilbert was
therefore concerned that male and female employees be treated
19. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
20. Id.
21. 429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976).
22. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 (1972). See infra
notes 40-57 and accompanying text for more detail on the EEOC guidelines.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982): "The Commission shall have the authority from
time to time to issue, amend, or rescind suitable procedural regulations to carry out the subdi-
visions of this subchapter ....
24. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975): "Dis-
abilities caused by pregnancy shall be treated the same as disabilities caused by other medical
conditions under any ...leave plan available in connection with employment."
25. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976).
26. Id. at 142. (The guidelines were first promulgated eight years after enactment of
Title VII).
27. Id. at 143.
28. Id. at 139 (emphasis in original).
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equally with regard to parity in employment fringe benefits.
In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty,9 the Court followed Gilbert and
denied sick-pay benefits for pregnant employees.30 The Court did,
however, find that the employer's policy of excluding only employees
on pregnancy disability sick leave from accumulating seniority, while
those on other disability leaves retained seniority, was an unlawful
deprivation of an employment opportunity for women."1 Here the
Court found unlawful disparate treatment of the sexes in the area of
seniority because the employer "imposed on women a substantial
burden that men need not suffer." 2 The Court was able to protect a
pregnant employee's seniority rights in this case even without the
specific PDA prohibition of discrimination based on pregnancy. This
was because in Satty both male and female employees were similarly
situated-employees of one sex on disability leave accrued seniority
and employees of the other sex did not. Here, pregnancy did not
even have to enter the analysis because women on leave were treated
differently than men on leave with regard to seniority benefits. Title
VII strictly forbids such disparate treatment of similarly situated
employees.
The Court resolved each of these sex discrimination cases dif-
ferently. In Satty, the Court could analyze the fact pattern without
regard to pregnancy, and could hold that disparate treatment of the
sexes violated Title VII. Yet in Gilbert, the Court could not find
disparate treatment because it did not have any legislative guidance
that discrimination based on pregnancy was the equivalent of dis-
crimination based on sex. Without the PDA, the Court could do
nothing to assure employees of either sex the right to pregnancy-
related benefits.
B. Enactment of the PDA-The Congressional Response
Congress responded to the Supreme Court's unguided handling
of Title VII pregnancy cases with the enactment of the PDA."3 The
enactment of the PDA is another important step toward recognizing
a man's right to child-care leave because it prohibits discrimination
in allocating pregnancy-related benefits. The PDA adds to the Title
VII same-treatment mandate by defining discrimination on the basis
29. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
30. Id. at 145-46.
31. Id. at 139-41.
32. Id. at 142.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(k) (1982); see supra note 7.
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of pregnancy as unlawful sex discrimination. The legislation was en-
acted to reverse the effect of the Gilbert analysis which "left a gaping
hole in the protection afforded by Title VII." '34 The Senate Commit-
tee Report on the PDA said the effect of the Gilbert decision
threatened "to undermine the central purpose of the sex discrimina-
tion prohibitions of Title VII""3 because: "A failure to address dis-
crimination based on pregnancy, in fringe benefits or in any other
employment practice, would prevent the elimination of sex discrimi-
nation in employment." 36 Thus, Congress enacted the PDA to ex-
pand the scope of Title VII to cover discriminatory employment ac-
tion which is based on pregnancy or related conditions. 37
1. PDA Statutory Language
Specifically, the PDA amended section 701 of the Civil Rights
Act by adding a new subsection. The subsection specifies that the
terms "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex" include but are not
limited by pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions.38 This
section expressly provides that women affected by pregnancy or re-
lated medical conditions must be treated the same-no better or no
worse-as other employees for all employment related purposes, in-
cluding the receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs. 39 The
statutory language gives all employees the right to be treated the
same with regard to all employment practices, policies, and fringe
benefits.
2. The EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex-197240 and 19794'
The EEOC, as the agency charged with interpreting and imple-
menting Title VII,"2 has the authority to issue guidelines that define
and clarify employer obligations under Title VII. Congress did not
34. S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1977), reprinted in New 1978 Pregnancy
Benefits and Discrimination Rules, (BNA) at 159 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
35. Id. at 153.
36. Id.
37. See also Comment, Interpretation of the Pregnancy Disability Act and EEOC
Guidelines: Conflicting Federal Responses and Analogous Confusion at the State Level, 1
DET. C.L. REV. 77, 84 (1984).
38. See supra note 7.
39. Id.
40. 37 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604-1604.10).
41. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,803 (1979) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604-1604.10).
42. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-12(a) (1982); see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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give the Commission law-making authority' therefore, the EEOC's
guidelines are not the equivalent of statutes or regulations. Thus, the
guidelines do not carry the force of law."' Traditionally, the Court
will defer to EEOC guidelines only when they are internally consis-
tent with other EEOC positions on the issue, and when their appli-
cation would not be inconsistent with obvious congressional intent.'
The EEOC's two sets of Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex, however, are consistent clarifications of Title VII sex dis-
crimination prohibitions. 4'6 The first set of guidelines was issued in
1972,' v prior to the PDA enactment. The second set was issued in
1979,48 one year after the PDA. Although they were issued seven
years apart, the two sets of guidelines are nearly identical. 4' Each set
contains general principles to eliminate sex discrimination that apply
to men and women, including seniority systems, 50 sex as a bona fide
occupational qualification, 1 job opportunities advertising,52 fringe
benefits," and employment policies relating to pregnancy and child-
birth.6' Most significantly, both sets of guidelines call for employees
to be treated equally without regard to sex.
For example, the Employment Policies Relating to Pregnancy
and Childbirth guideline requires employers to treat disabilities
caused or contributed to by pregnancy or related medical conditions
the same as the employer treats all other temporary disabilities. 5
The Fringe Benefit guideline includes in its definition "medical, hos-
pital, accident, life insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing
and bonus plans; leave; and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment."" This guideline specifically mandates identical treat-
43. Id.
44. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 n.20 (1976).
45. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) (Court refused to defer to
EEOC guidelines which were inconsistent with obvious congressional intent).
46. See infra notes 47-48.
47. 37 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604-1604.10).
48. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,803 (1979) (codified at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604-1604.10).
49. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1983). The
1979 guidelines add "childbirth or related medical conditions" in addition to pregnancy as
prima facie violations of Title VII when employers use them to exclude applicants or employ-
ees, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(a) (1985).
50. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (1985).
51. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (1985).
52. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.5 (1985).
53. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1985).
54. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1985).
55. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1985).
56. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a) (1985) (em-
phasis added).
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ment of the sexes by making it "an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to discriminate between men and women with re-
gard to fringe benefits. '"5 7 Both sets of guidelines recognize a man's
right to existing employer-provided pregnancy related benefits by cit-
ing men as potential recipients.
3. The EEOC Questions and Answers of 197958
The EEOC's 1979 sex discrimination guidelines differ from the
1972 version because they include an appendix of thirty-seven Ques-
tions and Answers.59 These Questions and Answers were designed to
supplement the EEOC's 1979 Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex and to respond "to urgent concerns raised by employees, em-
ployers, unions and insurers who sought the Commission's guidance
in understanding their rights and obligations under the [PDA]." 60 In
the introduction to these Questions and Answers, the EEOC reiter-
ates its position that the underlying principle of Title VII is that
"employees be treated equally without regard to their race, sex,
color, religion, or national origin. This equality of treatment encom-
passes the receiving of fringe benefits made available in connection
with employment."' The Questions and Answers [with the excep-
tion of Question and Answer 18(A)] 62 inform employers that both
male and female employees have rights to pregnancy-related employ-
ment benefits.
Yet, the enactment of the PDA and the EEOC guidelines were
not enough to convince the courts that men were entitled to share in
pregnancy-related employment benefits. Lower court decisions after
the PDA tended to narrowly construe the PDA and to limit its ap-
plication only to the pregnancy-related conditions of female employ-
ees.6" Finally, in Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
57. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b) (1985).
58. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804 (1979).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804-805 (1979).
62. See infra notes 83-113 and accompanying text.
63. In EEOC v. Emerson Electronic, 539 F. Supp. 153 (E.D. Mo. 1982), an employer's
health plan covered the medical expenses of spouses, but limited coverage for a spouse's preg-
nancy-related conditions. The court analyzed the wording of the PDA and concluded that
although legislative history indicated an intent that the Act was to protect only the benefits of
female employees and not the spouses of male employees. This court also rejected the EEOC
Interpretive Guidelines. In EEOC v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. Inc., 680 F.2d 1243 (9th
Cir. 1982), vacated, 463 U.S. 1203 (1983), a medical plan excluded coverage for pregnancy-
related conditions of the spouses of male employees. The court held that under Title VII as
amended by the PDA, such exclusion for male employee dependents did not constitute gender-
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EEOC,I" the Supreme Court agreed to address the question of
whether the PDA protected male employees in the area of spousal
pregnancy insurance coverage.
III. THE Newport News DECISION
In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC,6"
the Court interpreted the PDA for the first time and found that it
conferred employment rights to both men and women. The majority
held that the employer's limited spousal pregnancy insurance cover-
age violated Title VII by discriminating against male employees.66
The Newport News decision recognized that the PDA protects the
rights of both male and female employees to receive pregnancy-re-
lated benefits.'7
A. Newport News Facts and Arguments
The Newport News & Dry Dock Shipbuilding Co. provided a
medical plan for its employees that included comprehensive preg-
nancy benefits for female employees and 100 percent coverage of
medical benefits for the spouse of a female employee. Male employ-
ees were also given comprehensive insurance coverage of personal
medical conditions, but pregnancy benefits for their spouses were
limited under certain conditions.68
The employer argued that the PDA applied exclusively to fe-
male employees and maintained that by enacting the PDA Congress
focused "on the needs of female members of the workforce rather
than the spouses of male employees." 9 The EEOC countered that
Title VII principles would not allow any interpretation of the PDA
that would bar discrimination claims from male employees. There-
fore, the EEOC claimed the employer "had unlawfully refused to
provide full insurance coverage for [a male employee's spouse's] hos-
based discrimination. The decision in EEOC v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 524 F. Supp. 1141
(N.D. Ill. 1981), held that the PDA did not require an employer to provide the same insur-
ance benefits for spouses of male employees as it provided for dependents of female employees.
The court reasoned that the PDA was enacted to narrowly overrule Gilbert and therefore
applied only to pregnancy-related conditions of female employees and not to spouses of male
employees.
64. 667 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.), affd on rehearing, 682 F.2d 113 (4th Cir. 1982), affd,
462 U.S. 669 (1983).
65. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
66. Id. at 685.
67. ld..
68. Id. at 672-73.
69. Id. at 679.
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pitalization caused by pregnancy." 7
B. Newport News Reasoning and Holding
The issue before the Court was whether the petitioner had "dis-
criminated against its male employees with respect to their compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of
their sex within the meaning of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII. ' 71
The Court noted that although neither the PDA nor Title VII con-
tains a definition of the word "discriminate," analysis "beyond the
bare statutory language" of Title VII, including its legislative his-
tory, reveals Congress enacted the PDA to overturn both the specific
holding in Gilbert72 and to add "discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy" to the definition of what constitutes unlawful sex
discrimination.
7 8
The Court then rebutted the employer's claim that these new
PDA protections were limited to women, by noting that "Congress
had always intended to protect all individuals from sex discrimina-
tion in employment-including but not limited to pregnant women
workers."7
4
The Court held that the PDA applies to all employees because
health insurance and other fringe benefits are, by definition, compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. 5 Therefore,
male as well as female employees are protected against discrimina-
tion in the distribution of these benefits. 7 6 The Court held the medi-
cal plan violated the PDA because the proper Title VII discrimina-
tion test prohibits employers from treating "a male employee with
dependents in a manner which, but for that person's sex, would be
different. '77
This Title VII discrimination test calls for identical treatment
of the sexes. This test implies that identical treatment not only
means that all employees be treated the same with regard to the dis-
tribution of benefits, but that all employees are protected from em-
ployment discrimination by the same Title VII standards. Thus, the
70. Id. at 674.
71. Id. at 675.
72. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
73. 462 U.S. 669.
74. Id. at 681 (emphasis added).
75. Id. at 682.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 683 (quoting City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 711 (1977)).
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Court implicitly held that the PDA serves as a legitimate means for
male employees to assert their rights to pregnancy-related employ-
ment benefits.
The Newport News decision reflected an overall concern to
eliminate unequal treatment between the sexes with regard to the
allocation of pregnancy-related employment benefits. Yet the Court's
broad interpretation of the PDA and its reference to particular
EEOC guidelines 78 still leaves many pregnancy benefits discrimina-
tion issues unresolved.
IV. QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED By Newport News
The Newport News decision held that the PDA protects the
spouses of male employees in the area of pregnancy disability medi-
cal benefits coverage by requiring they be treated the same as the
spouses of female employees. Yet, the Court offered no guidance as
to what extent the PDA provides male employees rights to any other
pregnancy-related benefits. The Court, in reaching its decision, took
guidance from the 1978 appendix of EEOC Questions and Answers
numbers 21 and 22" which refer to spousal and dependent medical
plan coverage. The Court did not elaborate on any of the other
EEOC Questions and Answers or specify what level of deference
should be accorded to them. The EEOC is authorized to promulgate
"procedural regulations to carry out the provisions of [Title VII]," 80
yet EEOC directives are not afforded the force of law because Con-
gress did not give the Commission law-making authority.81 Thus,
the validity of the remaining EEOC Questions and Answers remains
unclear.
A. PDA Coverage of Infant Care Leave-The Conflict Defined
The Newport News decision held that the PDA protects male
employees at least with regard to equal coverage of existing preg-
nancy disability benefits in an employer-provided medical plan. The
Court held that the PDA was a legitimate means for men to assert
their right to this specific pregnancy-related benefit.
78. 462 U.S. 669, 673-74. The Court referred to Questions and Answers 21 and 22
which concern insurance coverage for the medical expenses of pregnancy-related conditions of
spouses of male employees and other dependents of all employees. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,803, at
23,807 (1979).
79. 462 U.S. 669, 673-74; see supra note 78.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1982).
81. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 n.20 (1976).
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Yet, EEOC Question and Answer 18(A) 82 erodes a man's right
to child-care leave. Question and Answer 18(A) states that infant-
care leave is not included in the PDA protections and implies that
only female employees may take advantage of this employment bene-
fit. The PDA must be interpreted to protect existing infant-care
leave benefits before the Newport News reasoning can extend the
right to this pregnancy-related benefit to men. Specifically, the text
of Question and Answer 18(A) reads:
18(A) Q. Must an employer grant leave to a female employee
for child care purposes after she is medically able to work fol-
lowing leave necessitated by pregnancy, childbirth or related
medical conditions?
A. While leave for child care purposes is not covered by the
[PDA], ordinary Title VII principles would require that leave
for child care purposes be granted on the same basis as leave
which is granted to employees for other non-medical reasons.
For example, if an employer allows its employees to take leave
without pay or accrued annual leave for travel or education
which is not job related, the same type of leave must be granted
to those who wish to remain on leave for infant care, even
though they are medically able to return to work.8"
The following analysis will show that the application of Ques-
tion and Answer 18(A) violates the Title VII identity of treatment
philosophy. Question and Answer 18(A) would not only be inconsis-
tent with obvious congressional intent, but would also contradict ear-
lier EEOC positions. The PDA must extend to protect a male em-
ployee's right to employer-provided child-care leave in order to
comply with the Title VII mandate that all employees be treated the
same. To defer to Question and Answer 18(A) would encourage un-
lawful disparate treatment of men and women in violation of Title
VII by restricting this important employment fringe benefit to
women.
B. Specific Problems with EEOC Question and Answer 18(A)
1. Question and Answer 18(A) is Inconsistent with Obvious
Legislative Intent
Statements in the PDA legislative history illustrate the congres-
sional desire that the PDA "protection [extend] to the whole range of
82. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,807 (1979).
83. Id. (emphasis added).
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matters concerning the childbearing process. ' 84 For example, a state-
ment in the Senate Report implies that the PDA was designed to
include employer infant-care leave policies:
[T]he assumption that women will become pregnant and leave
the labor market is at the core of the sex stereotyping resulting
in unfavorable disparate treatment of women in the workplace.
A failure to address discrimination based on pregnancy, in
fringe benefits or any other employment practice, would prevent
the elimination of sex discrimination in employment. 85
This statement demonstrates that Congress intended the PDA
to confer a comprehensive protection against discrimination in preg-
nancy-related benefits. Congressional intent, therefore, would logi-
cally extend the scope of the PDA to protect infant-care leave. The
PDA could then eradicate employment sex discrimination by man-
dating that an employer's pregnancy-related fringe benefit policies be
available to both men and women.
2. EEOC Question and Answer 18(A) Contradicts Earlier
Agency Positions
In addition to contradicting the legislative purpose and goals of
the PDA, Question and Answer 18(A) is internally inconsistent with
regard to the other EEOC sex discrimination guidelines issued con-
temporaneously. Section 1604.9(a) of both the 1972 and 1979 EEOC
guidelines defines fringe benefits to include "leave; and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment." '86 Section 1604.9(b)
prescribes that "[iut shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate between men and women with regard to
fringe benefits."8 Taken together, EEOC sections 1604.9(a) and (b)
clearly define "leave" as a "fringe benefit" and prohibit sex discrimi-
nation with respect to such benefits.88 The statement in Question
and Answer 18(A) that child care is not covered by the PDA conflicts
with the agency's own previous guideline that leave and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment mandate Title VII
protection.89
Yet the internal inconsistencies of Question ' and Answer 18(A)
84. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4749, 4753 [hereinafter cited as H. REP.].
85. S. REP. supra note 34, at 153. (emphasis added).
86. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a) (1985).
87. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(b) (1985).
88. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a) (1985).
89. See Leeds, Maternity Leave for Fathers, 55 N.Y. ST. B. J. 32, 34 (1983).
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do not end there. The last sentence of the 18(A) Answer implies that
women have the sole responsibility for child care by use of the
phrase "those who wish to remain on leave for infant care." 90 This
assumption negates the EEOC guidelines themselves, as well as the
legislative goal of Title VII, which both aim to prohibit discrimina-
tory disparate treatment of the sexes and to eliminate the unfounded
stereotypes that accompany such treatment. The PDA does not man-
date that employers must provide child-care leave, but if employers
do so provide it, leave must be available on an equal basis to employ-
ees of both sexes according to the EEOC Fringe Benefit guideline.9
EEOC Question and Answer 18(A) contradicts this unambiguous
PDA legislative and administrative mandate by implying that men
and women may be treated differently with regard to the availability
of child-care leave.
3. Question and Answer 18(A) Lacks Authority
Supreme Court case law provides guidance on how to determine
whether, and to what extent EEOC guidelines should be accorded
deference. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,92 the Court said that be-
cause "the act and its legislative history support the Commission's
construction, this affords good reason to treat the guidelines as ex-
pressing the will of Congress." 93 However, in Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Co.,"" the Court refused to defer to EEOC guide-
lines that were internally inconsistent with regard to other agency
positions and that "would be inconsistent with an obvious congres-
sional intent." 95
Moreover, the Gilbert" Court disregarded the 1972 EEOC
guidelines by using the test set forth in Skidmore v. Swift Co.97
Under that test, the weight given EEOC guidelines will depend
upon the "validity of [their] reasoning, [their] consistency with ear-
lier pronouncements, and all those factors which give [them] power
to persuade." 98 The Court applied the Skidmore test and disregarded
the 1972 guidelines in part because they contradicted an earlier
90. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604 App. 18(A) (1979)
(emphasis added).
91. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(a) (1985).
92. 401 U.S. 424 (1970).
93. Id. at 434.
94. 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
95. Id. at 94-95.
96. 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
97. 323 U.S. 134 (1934).
98. Id. at 140 (quoted in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976)).
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agency policy, 99 and because they were inconsistent with indicia of
proper legislative intent contained in legislative history records.' 00
These Supreme Court rulings determine the proper disposition
of Question and Answer 18(A). First, EEOC Question and Answer
18(A)'s statement that child-care leave is not covered by the PDA is
inconsistent with the EEOC's earlier Fringe Benefit guideline sec-
tion 1604.9 that defines "leave" as a PDA protected employment
benefit. 1 1
Second, although the House and Senate reports state that the
EEOC's 1972 guidelines rightly implemented the Title VII prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination,'0 2 there is no similar indication of a con-
gressional endorsement or even of a review of the 1979 Questions and
Answers. The Fringe Benefit definition, section 1604.9, remained un-
changed from the 1972 guidelines to the 1979 guidelines. To the ex-
tent that the Fringe Benefit guideline remained unchanged from its
1972 congressional endorsement to 1979, implies Congress felt the
EEOC correctly determined that leave is a PDA protected fringe
benefit. Yet Question and Answer 18(A) cannot claim the continuing
congressional endorsement of the Guidelines on Discrimination Be-
cause of Sex. This is because Question and Answer 18(A) was first
printed after Congress had endorsed the EEOC 1972 guidelines.
Since it enacted the PDA in 1978, Congress has had no occasion to
comment on the accuracy of the Questions and Answers. Moreover,
Question and Answer 18(A) was not even included when the Ques-
tions and Answers were first published in interim form for public
comment,' but was added for the first time when the guidelines
were published in final form one month later.' 4 Therefore, the lan-
guage of 18(A) did not even receive public comment regarding its
accuracy prior to its final publication.
Finally, legislative records indicate that both the Senate and the
House found that fringe benefits such as leave deserved PDA protec-
tions. The House report discusses "Other Employment Policies" and
states:
[T]he consequences of other discriminatory employment policies
on pregnant women in general has historically had a persistent
and harmful effect upon their careers. . . . Therefore, elimina-
99. 429 U.S. at 142.
100. Id. at 143.
101. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
102. H. REP. supra note 84, at 4750; S. REP. supra note 34, at 152.
103. 44 Fed. Reg. 13,278 (1979).
104. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804 (1979).
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tion of discrimination based on pregnancy in these employment
practices in addition to disability and medical benefits will go a
long way toward providing equal employment opportunities for
women, the goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."05
Similarly, the Senate report declares in its "Leave and Other Poli-
cies" section that "in addition to its impact upon fringe benefit pro-
grams, this legislation proscribes various other employment policies
which adversely affect pregnant women. . . .The proscription of
such policies is perhaps the most important effect of this bill."' '
Question and Answer 18(A) contradicts previous EEOC provi-
sions on fringe benefits;107 fosters a stereotype that women are the
sole legitimate child-care providers, was not endorsed or reviewed by
Congress, and is contrary to legislative intent.'08 The applicable Su-
preme Court tests would disregard Question and Answer 18(A) as
unauthoritative.
Given these deficiencies, Question and Answer 18(A) should be
disregarded because existing'0 9 infant-care leave benefits are in-
cluded in the scope of PDA protections both by indicia of congres-
sional intent and by previous EEOC positions." 0
Moreover, the Newport News reasoning logically extends PDA
protection to recognize this pregnancy-related benefit for male em-
ployees. The Newport News decision held that Title VII PDA pro-
tections for spousal pregnancy disability benefits extend to male em-
ployees.' The decision cited EEOC Questions and Answers 21 and
22" but it gave no indication what, if any, deference should be ac-
corded the remaining Questions. Previous Supreme Court decisions
have declined to give deference to EEOC guidelines when such
guidelines are inconsistent with other prior agency positions, or
105. H. REP. supra note 84, at 4754.
106. S. REP. supra note 34, at 156.
107. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1985).
108. See supra notes 33-37, 105-06 and accompanying text.
109. Proposed federal legislation would require employers who do not currently provide
unpaid leave benefits to provide them to both male and female employees. This legislation is
now being developed by Rep. Pat Schroeder (D-Colo) and the Congressional Caucus for
Women's Issues to provide: 1) minimum unpaid disability leave for all employees who are
temporarily disabled; and 2) minimum unpaid parental leave for all employees upon birth or
adoption of their child. H.R. 2020.
In California, proposed A.B. 613 would make it an unlawful employment practice for any
employer to refuse to permit an employee to take a leave of up to one year for child rearing.
110. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
111. 462 U.S. 669; see also supra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
112. 462 U.S. at 673-74.
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when they contradict legislative intent.'" Question and Answer
18(A) is inconsistent internally with both prior agency interpretations
and legislative intent. Not only does it foster stereotypes concerning
sex roles, but adhering to its recommendation would render the PDA
ineffective to eradicate discriminatory, disparate treatment of the
sexes in the area of infant-care leave fringe benefits. A male em-
ployee would not have a PDA-protected right to infant-care leave if
Question and Answer 18(A) was implemented. Therefore, Question
and Answer 18(A) should be disregarded as counter-productive given
these deficiencies.
V. RESOLUTION: THE PDA PROTECTS EXISTING INFANT CARE
LEAVE
The scope of PDA protections should extend to make infant-
care leave available to men because it is unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against any employee with respect to "compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's . . . sex.'1 14
Legislative intent, judicial reasoning, and overall administrative
interpretation emphasize that both sexes should be accorded the
same treatment in all employment policies in order to eliminate em-
ployment sex discrimination. Senator Williams' remarks, for exam-
ple, are evidence that congressional intent in enacting the PDA was
"to protect all individuals from unjust employment discrimina-
tion.""' 5 The Newport News decision held both that the PDA pro-
tects male employees with regard to spousal pregnancy disability
benefits and that the sexes should not be treated "in a manner which
but for that person's sex would be different.""' 6
Finally, the preface to the 1979 EEOC Guidelines on Discrimi-
nation Because of Sex cite "The underlying principle of Title VII is
that . . . employees be treated equally without regard to their . . .
sex . . . . This equality of treatment encompasses the receiving of
fringe benefits made available in connection with employment.""'
Synthesis of the interpretations of each of these three arms of
government advocate a policy that recognizes the right of male em-
ployees to equal access to child-care leave. Therefore, if an employer
113. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43.
114. See supra note 6.
115. 462 U.S. 669, 681 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 7539 (1977)).
116. 462 U.S. 669, 683 (quoting City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)).
117. 44 Fed. Reg. 23,804-05 (1979).
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grants child-care leave to female employees, the PDA mandates such
leave must be available to male employees on the same basis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Title VII requires that employers treat all employees the same
with regard to employment fringe benefits. The PDA expands this
provision to include employer-provided pregnancy-related fringe
benefits. The Newport News decision held that PDA provisions pro-
tect male employees in the allocation of at least one pregnancy-re-
lated fringe benefit-dependent medical coverage. Legislative history
indicates Congress intended the scope of the PDA to cover all preg-
nancy-related fringe benefits, including existing child-care leave ben-
efits. Thus, the PDA, as interpreted by the Newport News decision,
recognizes a man's right to employer-provided child-care leave fringe
benefits.
The PDA's protection of male employees in the area of child-
care leave means men can have job security while taking part in
important parenting functions which employment practices in the
United States118 often discourage them from undertaking. Children,
too, can benefit from both male and female influences; both parents
have much to offer their children.
Cynthia Hecht
118. See supra note 2.
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